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Abstract—Attackers increasingly, and with high success rates,
use social engineering techniques to circumvent second factor
authentication (2FA) technologies, compromise user accounts
and sidestep fraud detection technologies. We introduce a social
engineering resistant approach that we term device-aware 2FA1,
to replace the use of traditional security codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL ENGINEERING has emerged as one of the prin-cipal threats against Internet security, and, by extension,
against society [1]. Social engineering corresponds to a spec-
trum of related abuses, all of which have one thing in common:
The use of deception to sidestep existing security measures.
Social engineering is at the heart of phishing attacks, for ex-
ample, whether the attacker aims to siphon off funds or emails
from compromised accounts; it is also the principle underlying
the operation of Business Email Compromise attacks, where
criminals pose as trusted colleagues and request for payments
to be made or data to be shared. In both of these attacks,
one part of the social engineering involves posing as a trusted
party.
The security community’s initial reaction to new social
engineering attacks appears always to be awareness cam-
paigns. While these are typically not very effective, they are
quick to deploy and help contain the damage as technical
countermeasures are developed and rolled out. Once deployed,
the technical countermeasures reduce the profits of the crimi-
nals, forcing them to search for alternative ways of deceiving
people. As a prime example of this, we find that the recent
successes of security technologies that identify and block
identity deception have resulted in criminals instead trying
to compromise legitimate email accounts. The compromised
accounts, in turn, are used to harvest information and to
deceive other users – namely contacts of the owners of the
compromised accounts. Currently deployed security systems,
many of which focus on identifying when an attacker mas-
querades as another user, do not flag emails from compromised
accounts – after all, these are emails from legitimate accounts,
sent to people who in the past have communicated with these
users. Typically, the criminals compromise these “launchpad”
accounts by stealing the credentials from the account owners.
One increasingly common approach of doing that is for the
criminals to initiate a password reset for an intended launchpad
account, and then use social engineering methods to trick the
account owner to send them the password reset code. This
attack, which is illustrated in Fig. 1, is also commonly used
to complete high-value transactions for accounts that have
already been compromised, or to circumvent any other use
of 2FA.
1Patents pending.
Fig. 1. The figure illustrates the typical flow of a social engineering attack
on 2FA, in which an attacker uses deception to trick a victim to forward a
security code that enables the attacker to compromise the victim’s account.
A related attack can be used against token-based 2FA solutions.
Another common approach to compromise accounts is SIM-
jacking [2], [3]. In this attack, the criminal does not interact
with the intended victim. Instead, he causes the victim’s
carrier to change the mapping between the victim’s phone
number and the associated SIM card so that any call or SMS
intended for the victim user instead get routed to the attacker.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Once this is done, the criminal can
gain access to any of the victim’s accounts secured by SMS-
based 2FA, simply by initiating password resets on behalf
of the victim. As the service provider sends password reset
codes to the victim’s phone number, these are delivered to the
criminal. This attack recently caused Twitter to make SMS-
based 2FA optional for their users [4] — however, it is unclear
that the alternatives offered provide much better protection.
Fig. 2. The figure illustrates SIM-jacking, followed by the automated theft of a
2FA code. The attacker causes the carrier to map the victim’s phone number to
the attacker’s SIM. After requesting a password reset from a service provider,
the 2FA code is sent directly to the attacker’s phone.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of SMS-based 2FA
method, protecting both against attacks where the attacker uses
social engineering to deceive his victim and attacks based on
SIM-jacking.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
06
07
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 J
an
 20
20
2II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING
Social Engineering first became the material of mainstream
media coverage in the mid-2000s, with the rapid rise of
phishing attacks. In early phishing attacks, the criminals
spoofed financial institutions by abusing weaknesses in the
email protocol, thereby making the phishing emails appear
to have been sent by the impersonated financial institutions.
The spoofed emails instructed would-be victims to click on
hyperlinks and “log in.” At first, the response from the secu-
rity community was that of awareness campaigns, commonly
suggesting that the users look out for poorly spelled or poorly
formatted emails. As this approach proved insufficient, it
was soon followed by efforts to quickly identify phishing
websites referred to in the phishing emails, and to mount
take-down efforts of these. A lack of procedure, however,
initially resulted in typical take-down times on the order of
a month, later coming down to hours or days [5]. Given that
typical user reactions commonly take place within minutes or
hours [6], take-down was not a sustainable response, and, like
awareness campaigns, failed to curb the abuse. The volume of
phishing attacks only started to fall in response to the rollout of
DMARC [7], an Internet standard addressing email spoofing.
Starting around 2015, Business Email Compromise (BEC)
attacks saw a similarly meteoric rise [8], [9] as phishing attacks
had ten years earlier. In BEC attacks, criminals pose as trusted
parties by using deceptive display names, thereby effectively
dodging the protection offered by DMARC by avoiding the
use of email spoofing. (The difference between spoofing and
deceptive display names is illustrated in Figure 3.)
Fig. 3. The figure illustrates the difference between spoofing and the use of
deceptive display names. In a spoofed email, the impersonated user appears
as the apparent sender, but in an attack using deceptive display names, that is
not so. DMARC detects spoofed emails, but not emails with deceptive display
names.
At first, the response of the security community was, again,
that of awareness campaigns. While these still remain a
commonly advocated line of defense, many email security
companies have also introduced automated detection methods
that identify high-risk emails by determining when emails
from non-trusted parties use display names of trusted parties
and alert the recipient – see, e.g., Figure 4. Like DMARC
automated the detection of typical phishing attacks, the de-
tection of deceptive display names has addressed BEC and
related abuses. However, the success of these countermeasures
is also causing the attacks to evolve, leading to the next wave
of attacks.
While criminals have shown no sign of abandoning social
engineering, they have – time after time – demonstrated that
they will move on to new types of attacks once the security in-
Fig. 4. The figure shows a Google-issued warning shown to a user receiving
an email from a “new” sender with the same display name as a (to the
recipient) known sender. By drawing the attention of the recipient to the
potential risk, abuses such as Business Email Compromise are countered.
dustry has deployed countermeasures that sufficiently hamper
their efforts. Thus, the successes within the security industry,
ironically, are what shape the criminal trends. The two most
recent trends in social engineering both relate to account
compromise, and while both attacks are well understood, the
deployed defenses have not yet matured beyond awareness
campaigns.
Launchpad Attacks. In one of these two types of at-
tacks, termed a launchpad attack [10], an attacker that has
compromised an email account (of a “launchpad user”) uses
the compromised account to send out messages to contacts
of the email account owner. These users, who are the real
victims of the attack, may be asked to make payments, share
documents, or install software. Since the attacker uses a
legitimate account of a trusted contact, both the victim and
his security technologies decide (with a high likelihood) that
the email is legitimate, making this attack very dangerous.
Account Compromise. In the other social engineering
attack currently on the rise (see, e.g., [11],) an attacker uses
social engineering for account compromise, as opposed to
using compromised accounts for social engineering. The two
common approaches, as described in the introduction, is to
attempt to trick the account owner to forward password reset
codes, or to use SIM-jacking to steal the delivery channel for
the password reset codes.
The victim-facing attack has been partially addressed in a
recent publication by Siadati et al. [12], while SIM-jacking has
remained unaddressed [13], becoming a thorny security issue
to many organizations [14]. Many launchpad attacks start out
as account compromise attacks. However, account compromise
attacks are used in many other types of abuses, such as in
phishing attacks used to infiltrate organizations [15].
This article focuses on improving the security of 2FA
by introducing a new SMS-based 2FA paradigm, thereby
protecting users against account compromise, and the attacks
that stem from it.
III. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
The user experience of our proposed solution closely re-
sembles that of traditional methods. However, under the hood,
our proposed method provides additional functionality: Using
device identification methods, the service provider (e.g., the
website of the bank, social media provider or email service
provider) determines whether a 2FA challenge is being for-
warded or whether it is responded to by a recognized device
associated with the account of the 2FA challenge.
3A. Device-Aware 2FA
Instead of sending traditional 2FA messages containing
security codes, the service provider sends a 2FA challenge
with one or more clickable links. An example 2FA challenge
is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. The figure shown an example 2FA challenge with two clickable
links. If the user clicks on either, the service provider receives a request from
the user’s browser, along with HTML cookies and other trackers, which are
used to determine whether the click originated from a device recognized as
belonging to the account owner. While the SMS standard does not support
HTML, most SMS apps will interpret SMS text and identify URLs.
When the user clicks on a link, the service provider receives
a webpage request from the user’s browser, along with any
HTML cookies (and other trackers) associated with the user
device and the service provider domain. The service provider
verifies that the click came from a device that is recognized as
belonging to the account owner. This makes the second factor
authentication device-aware. A device-aware 2FA process is
illustrated in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. The figure illustrates the flow for 2FA challenges. Instead of manually
copying codes, the user only has to click. Escalation can be performed by
sending another 2FA challenge, e.g., to another registered phone number
or email address associated with the user, or to perform knowledge-based
authentication.
The 2FA is triggered by a request to perform a sensitive
action – such as changing a password or a delivery address,
performing a large transfer of funds, or performing an action
that is anomalous, based on the user’s history. The 2FA
challenge is said to succeed if the user’s device is recognized.
The user is then allowed to complete the sensitive action on
the same device that was used to respond to the challenge
– this ascertains that the user knows what action is being
completed. An example is shown in Figure 7. If, on the other
hand, the user’s device is not recognized, then an escalation
process is performed, if available; this may involve using
another registered device to pass a second 2FA challenge or to
perform knowledge-based authentication. Most organizations
have escalation processes in place already, since the standard
SMS-based 2FA also can fail.
Fig. 7. The figure illustrates the action taken in response to a successful 2FA
challenge. The user is asked to review and approve the sensitive action that
triggered the 2FA. The approval is taking place on the device used to respond
to the 2FA challenge, as opposed to on the device that initiated the request
for the sensitive action.
B. Understanding Security
With device-aware 2FA, traditional social engineering that
aims to trick the intended victim to forward 2FA challenges to
the attacker will no longer be meaningful. This is because the
attacker’s device will not be recognized as belonging to the
account owner: The attacker does not have the cookies (and
other identifiers) that the user has. SIM-jacking will also not
succeed, for the same reasons.
Consider now an attacker who performs an action that
causes a 2FA challenge to be sent to an intended victim,
and who then tricks the intended victim to click on the
2FA challenge. The service provider will consider the 2FA
challenge successful, since a recognized device was used
to respond to it; however, the account owner still has to
approve or complete the sensitive action in order for this to
be completed. For example, the account owner may have to
approve a new address, as illustrated in Figure 7, or may be
requested to set a new password. This completion process is
performed on the device used to pass the 2FA challenge (e.g.,
the user’s phone), as opposed to on the device that was used
to initiate the request that caused the 2FA (e.g., the attacker’s
computer). Therefore, the user will be aware of the action that
is being performed.
C. Recognizing Devices
Device-aware 2FA takes advantage of device-identifying
technologies that are already widely deployed, but uses them
differently. These device-identifying technologies include var-
ious types of cookies placed by a website onto a device,
such as HTML cookies, flash cookies and other types of
cookies. These identifiers are typically not possible to steal
by an attacker who has not already compromised the user’s
device – which is more involved than to compromise 2FA
or separate accounts accessed from the device. Moreover,
almost all websites already use such device identifiers, whether
for personalization or fraud detection. In fact, 2FA is often
activated if a user attempts to log in from a device that is not
recognized.
Device-identifying technologies also include read-only char-
acteristics such as browser type and version installed, touch-
screen support, system fonts installed, languages installed,
screen size, color depth, time zone, and browser plug-in de-
tails. Service providers can also use additional characteristics
such as the user’s network name, carrier name and information
4related to her geolocation. While the digital fingerprints made
up by these read-only identifiers aren’t unique to each device,
there are so many permutations of user hardware and software
attributes that it is unlikely for two devices to share a common
fingerprint. Also, while a competent attacker can be expected
to steal some of the read-only identifiers by tricking his victim
to click on a link to a website the attacker controls, it is
unlikely for a typical attacker to successfully steal all of these
identifiers.
By using risk-based authentication methods, service
providers can determine whether a given requested sensitive
action should be allowed, given the available evidence that a
device corresponds to a recognized device.
IV. SPECIAL CASE: NEW DEVICE
When the system receives a response to a 2FA challenge
from a “new” device, it has to determine whether this corre-
sponds to an attack or to a user having replaced her phone
(or other device) since the last time she used to to access
the service provider. This problem can be addressed using a
variety of well-known escalation methods.
Here, escalation may correspond to asking the user to use
another registered device to respond to a new challenge; to
respond to knowledge-based authentication (KBA) questions;
or otherwise prove access to a resource (e.g., being able to
determine the message associated with a 1-cent payment to
a checking account known to be associated with the user.)
The exact escalation process depends on the type of service
associated with the 2FA challenge.
An important system functionality is therefore to register
new devices associated with a user account. Device profiles
can be bootstrapped as users register devices during account
setup, and by asking an already recognized (and logged-in)
user to enroll new devices, as illustrated in Figure 8.
Fig. 8. The figure illustrates a possible device registration approach. As the
user scans the QR code with her new device, a request is sent to a webpage
whose URL is encoded using the QR code. This URL is unique to the user
and the time at which the QR code is presented. As the request is received,
the requesting device is profiled by the service provider.
Devices can also be automatically registered. For example,
if a user fails a 2FA challenge at first, due to her device
not being registered, and then succeeds during the escalation
process, then the user can be asked to confirm that she
performed the failed access; if she did, the device associated
with the failed access will be automatically registered. It is
desirable for users to have multiple devices registered; e.g.,
the user’s computer, tablet and phone, and potentially also a
device belonging to a trusted friend (where a reset from such
a device may require that the user also answers knowledge-
based questions.)
V. DISCUSSION
We have described a technical solution that addresses a
range of social engineering attacks related to 2FA. Our solution
is independent of the technology used for the delivery of the
attack – it works, for example, no matter whether the mode
of operation of a criminal is to attempt to circumvent 2FA
solutions in a manual manner (placing a phone call to the
victim) or in a highly automated manner (sending “phishing”
emails requesting the collaboration of the victim). It also
addresses attacks such as SIM-jacking attacks in which the
delivery channel is stolen.
Our approach is based on user devices being recognized
by service providers – a well understood problem that the
industry has already solved in a very robust manner for
reasons unrelated to 2FA – and offers a user experience that
is sufficiently similar to existing methods for us to expect a
simple adoption.
We believe that addressing today’s vulnerabilities associated
with 2FA technologies can have large positive benefits by
eliminating a common vector of compromise. However, we
are mindful of the fact that social engineering is a moving
target, and that protecting against one form of abuse entices
the criminals to develop another.
Thus, we believe that the security community must remain
vigilant and constantly on the lookout for new types of abuses.
Once identified, it is important to develop technical solutions
– as opposed to solutions based on awareness – to address the
new-found abuses. It is our belief that, while a useful second
line of defense, user awareness should not be the primary
defense against social engineering.
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